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lNTRODUCI10N
"The problem of juvenile delinquency must be dealt with in an ef
fective and meaningful manner if we are to reduce the ever increasing
levels of crime and improve the quality of life in America."1 With
these words, the United States Senate opened its report in support of
the first major federal juvenile delinquency statute in almost forty
years.2 The goal of the statute and of federal involvement in juvenile
delinquency proceedings was to give the highest attention to prevent-

1.

S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5285.

2. See S. REP. No. 93-1011 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5284.
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ing juvenile crime and to minimizing the involvement of juveniles in
the juvenile and criminal justice systems.3
Until 1974, the federal government played a relatively minor role
in the juvenile delinquency system. In that year, Congress, in accor
dance with a general trend toward federalizing crime, greatly ex
panded the jurisdiction of the federal government over juvenile
crime.4 Historically, crime, and particularly juvenile crime, was the re
sponsibility of state governments with very little involvement by the
federal government.5 In fact, the only major statute that dealt with ju
venile crime was the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938
("FJDA").6 The FIDA offered the United States Attorney General
discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a juvenile under the age of
eighteen who had not been surrendered to state officials or had been
charged with offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death.7 The
federal government rarely employed this statute, and therefore federal
involvement in juvenile delinquency proceedings remained virtually
nonexistent until 1974. In that year, Congress passed the Juvenile Jus
tice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 ("JJDPA")8 because it
felt that federal intervention was necessary to stem rising juvenile
crime rates, specifically, violent juvenile crime.9
Congress's enactment of the JJDPA was also motivated in part by
the haphazard way in which the federal government had previously
been attempting to alleviate the problem of juvenile delinquency. The
Senate, in 1974, stated that there was "[l]ittle coherent national plan
ning or established priority structure among the major programs
dealing with the problems of youth development and delinquency pre
vention . . . . The present array of programs demonstrates the lack of
priorities, emphasis and direction in the Federal Government's efforts
to combat delinquency."10

3. See S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5285.
4. Since 1970, Congress has created over forty percent of what comprises the current
federal criminal code. See Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, American Bar
Association, Criminal Justice Section, The Federalization of Criminal Law 7 (1998) (visited
Dec. 21, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/fedreport.html> [hereinafter ABA Report].
5. See NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL INmATIVES,
1960-1993, at 8 (1994).
6. See Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-666, §§ 1-9, 52 Stat.
764, 764-66 (1938) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031-5042 (West Supp. 1998)).
7. See §§ 1-9, 52 Stat. at 764-66.
8. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (1974), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998).
9. See S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 7 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5285-86.
As stated in the Senate Report, "fi]uveniles under 18 are responsible for 51 percent of the
total arrests for property crimes, 23 percent for violent crimes, and 45 percent for all serious
crimes." Id.
10. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5290 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-220 (1971)).
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The JJDPA drastically changed federal involvement in the field of
juvenile delinquency. Congress created a broad federal approach that
addressed both treatment and prosecution of juvenile offenders. The
major focus of the legislation was to provide funding for research and
programs to assist the states in their efforts to address the delinquency
problem.11 In addition to these programs, Congress vastly expanded
the basis for assuming federal jurisdiction over juvenile offenders.12
As currently amended,13 the JJDPA provides for prosecution of a ju
venile in federal court when:
[T]he Attorney General,14 after investigation, certifies to the appropriate
district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other ap
propriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume
jurisdiction over said juvenile . , (2) the State does not have available
programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the of
fense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or [one of a specified
number of drug or gang-related crimes], and that there is a substantial
Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Fed
eral jurisdiction.15
.

.

Accordingly, a United States Attorney who desires to proceed
against a juvenile in federal court must certify the existence of one of
the three factors listed above and that a substantial federal interest
exists in the prosecution.16 In practice, this requirement is often met
by a certification simply stating that these elements exist, without fur
ther explanation or support.17

11. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the JJDPA.
12. The change from the FIDA to the JIDPA was significant because Congress created
precise procedural guidelines for trying juveniles in federal court that did not exist under the
FIDA. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032. Accordingly, these changes provided the United States with
the means to assume federal jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. Furthermore, the JIDPA,
as will be seen in the remainder of this Note, devoted substantial federal resources to the
problem of juvenile delinquency. See Section I.A.
13. Congress made significant amendments to the JIDPA in 1984, see Pub. L. No. 98473, § 1201 (adding the "substantial Federal interest" requirement, lowering the transfer age
to fifteen, and expanding jurisdiction by adding additional crimes), and in 1988, see Pub. L.
No. 100-690, § 6467(a) (significantly expanding federal jurisdiction).
14. "Under the authorization found in 28 C.F.R. § 0.57, the Attorney General has dele
gated her certification and transfer authority to the United States Attorneys." United States
v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1317 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996).
15. 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (citations omitted).
16. There is a separate split in the federal circuits over whether the "substantial federal
interest" prong is required in all certifications or just for certifications involving a crime of
violence. This issue is beyond the scope of this Note and not relevant to the determination
of the issue that it addresses. This Note will argue that courts should review the certification
whenever the substantial federal interest must be asserted, regardless of how often this oc
curs. For a general discussion of this issue, see United States v. Juvenile #1, 118 F.3d 298, 303
n.6 (5th Cir. 1997).
17. A typical certification would include the following information: that there was "a
substantial federal interest in the case and the offenses warrant[ed] the exercise of Federal

1010

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1007

In response to the federalization of juvenile delinquency and the
increasing focus on federal jurisdiction, some juveniles have ques
tioned whether a substantial federal interest exists in their case and
have sought judicial review of the prosecutor's certification.18 The cir
cuit courts are split over the appropriateness of judicial review in this
context. The Fourth Circuit has held that the certification should be
reviewable by courts.19 In so holding, it relied on the legislative history
of the JJDPA, which stresses the importance of states' control over ju
venile delinquency, and Supreme Court precedent stating that certain
certifications regarding jurisdiction over juveniles made by prosecu
tors should be subject to judicial review.20 Many circuits, however,
have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's approach.21 With slight varia
tion, these courts have argued that the plain language of the JJDPA
precludes judicial review.22 Furthermore, their holdings state that
when the certification is based upon a judgment call by a prosecutor,
the certification belongs to a category of unreviewable prosecutorial
decisions.23
The Supreme Court established the ability of a lower court to sub
stantively review a certification by a federal prosecutor in Gutierrez de
Martinez v. Lamagno.24 The Fourth Circuit relied on this case in
United States v. Juvenile Male #125 to permit review of a federal prose
cutor's certification under the JJDPA. In Gutierrez de Martinez, the
jurisdiction." United States v. Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d 905, 906 (8th Cir. 1998) (quot
ing from the Certification to Proceed under the JJDPA) {alterations in original).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519 {7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d at 908.
19. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1314.
20. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1314.
21. See Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 541 {holding that "courts cannot review the substantive basis
of the Attorney General's certification of a 'substantial federal interest' " ); United States v.
Juvenile Male J.AJ., 134 F.3d at 908; United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 304 {5th
Cir. 1997); United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 511 {11th Cir. 1996) (holding that "[i]n the
absence of purely formal error on the face of the certification or proof of bad faith on the
part of the government .. . certifications made in accord with section 5032 customarily 'must
be accepted as final'"); United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 866-67 {2d Cir. 1995) (permitting
judicial review of whether the offense charged met the statutory requirements of the
JJDPA); United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378, 1380 {2d Cir. 1975).
22 See supra note 21. Despite claims by some courts that the JJDPA precludes substan
tive review of the certification, all of the circuits are in agreement that courts do have the
authority to review the certification for technical compliance with the requirements of the
JJDPA. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1396 {9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing the
age of the juvenile and its application to the statute's requirements for prosecution); United
States v. Cuomo, 525 F.2d 1285, 1287-89 {5th Cir. 1976) (ensuring that the certifying party
was the proper one and that the certification was timely).
23. See, e.g., Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 539-40; United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1478 {11th
Cir. 1984). ·
24. 515 U.S. 417 {1995).
25. 86 F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996).
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Supreme Court upheld review of a prosecutor's certification under the
Westfall Act that a federal employee was acting in the "scope-of
employment."26 In Westfall Act certifications, the prosecutor certifies
that a federal government employee was acting in the scope of his or
her employment when an incident, usually a tort, occurred.27 Once the
certification is made, the United States is substituted as the defendant
in the litigation.28 In Gutierrez de Martinez, the Court first noted that
because "federal judges traditionally proceed from the 'strong pre
sumption that Congress intends judicial review,' "29 review will not be
precluded unless there is a "persuasive reason to believe that such was
the purpose of Congress."30
Based upon this presumption, the Gutierrez de Martinez Court re
lied on three primary elements of the Westfall Act in permitting re
view. First, the Court examined the statutory language and concluded
that Congress made no mention of a court's inability to review a
prosecutor's certification.31 Second, the Court found it significant that
the legislative history of the Westfall Act showed that Congress did
not "commit . . . 'scope-of-employment' [decisions] . . . to the unre
viewable judgment of the Attorney General."32 Based on these textual
examinations, the Court held that it did not find any persuasive basis
"discernible from the statutory fog" to conclude that Congress in
tended to restrict judicial review.33 Instead, the Court found just the
opposite - that evidence existed indicating Congress may have fa
vored review.34 The third element in the Court's consideration in
volved important policy considerations that militated against preclud
ing review. The Court found that the United States has a strong
financial incentive in the certification of the employee as acting within
the scope of his employment.35 Additionally, the substitution of the
United States for the employee defendant upon certification under the
Westfall Act could result in the dismissal of the suit by the court under
sovereign immunity principles.36 The Court concluded that the com26. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995).
27. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(d)(l) (West Supp. 1994).
28. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(d)(l).
29. Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 424 (citing cases).
30. 515 U.S. at 424 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)) (emphasis added).
31. See 515 U.S. at 430-34.
32. 515 U.S. at 426.
33. 515 U.S. at 425.
34. See 515 U.S. at 431.
35. See 515 U.S. at 427.
36. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, there is an exception for acts that occur in a
foreign country. In Gutierrez de Martinez, the incident in question occurred in Colombia,
and therefore the Federal Tort Oaims Act did not apply. See 515 U.S. at 420.
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bination of these two policy considerations and the lack of a statutory
bar to judicial review supported the notion that Congress did not in
tend to preclude judicial review of the prosecutor's certification.37
Thus, the Court held that review of the certification should be permit
ted.
Following the Gutierrez de Martinez framework, this Note argues
that the review of certifications under the JJDPA should be permitted.
In the limited area of juvenile delinquency law, traditional notions of
prosecutorial discretion should yield to the unique circumstances sur
rounding the prosecution of children. Children should not be treated
as if they are simply young adults. They have unique needs and re
quire special treatment by the legal system.33 As a result, courts
should scrupulously review the certification for compliance with terms
of the JJDPA to ensure that federal jurisdiction is assumed only when
a substantial federal interest exists.39 Part I of this Note analyzes the
plain language and legislative history of the JJDPA to show that
Congress intended to limit the bases for federal jurisdiction and to
provide for judicial review over certification of juvenile cases to fed
eral courts. Part II argues that the policy of federal abstention and the
law's special treatment of children support judicial review of certifica
tions in the juvenile delinquency arena. The historical difference in
treatment of juvenile offenders is sufficient to overcome the tradi
tional deference given to prosecutorial decisionmaking. Courts should
review the certifications providing for federal jurisdiction over a child
to ensure that a substantial federal interest is present in the prosecu
tion of a child in the federal courts.
I.

ANALYZING THE JJDPA:

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE

AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE JJDPA

SUPPORT JUDICIAL REVIEW

In enacting the JJDPA and its subsequent amendments, Congress
has gradually expanded the bases for federal jurisdiction over juvenile
delinquency.40 At the same time, Congress has retained substantive
limitations on federal jurisdiction.41 These jurisdictional limitations

37. See 515 U.S. at 424-26.
38. See ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, A JUDGE'S GUIDE TO IMPROVING
LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN xiii (1998) (Foreword by Judge (Retired) Thomas
Hornsby).
39. Traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion would either categorically prohibit
judicial review or would limit challenges to substantive compliance, such as if the crime
committed is in fact a felony.
40. For a discussion of the amendments to the JJDPA, see supra note 13.

41. For a list of the statutory requirements for certification, see supra text accompanying
note 15.
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must be viewed in light of the history and philosophy of the JJDPA.
When federal jurisdiction is sought, it becomes clear that judicial re
view of prosecutorial certifications, to ensure that juveniles are tried in
the most appropriate forum, is a central component of federal in
volvement in the juvenile delinquency system.
In order to determine whether Congress intended to preclude judi
cial review, courts review the plain language and legislative history of
statutes.42 The Court has found judicial review to be precluded either
when Congress has expressly barred review or when a statute provides
no meaningful standards to guide judicial review.43 Section I.A argues
that the plain language of the statute exhibits no congressional intent
to preclude judicial review. Section I.B analyzes the legislative history
to show that Congress stressed the importance of state control of ju
venile delinquency· proceedings. This Part argues that Congress es
tablished standards for judicial review of the prosecutor's certification
to effectuate this policy of federal abstention.
A.

The Plain Language of the Statute Demonstrates No Congressional
Intent to Preclude Judicial Review

The plain language of the JJDPA does not preclude judicial review
of the prosecutor's certification.44 In the section of the JJDPA dis
cussing the certification procedure, there is no mention of a court's re
view of a prosecutor's certification.45 While some courts have pointed
to the lack of specific authorization of judicial review in the JJDPA as
indication of a congressional intent to prevent review,46 the failure of
Congress to mention judicial review, standing alone, does not bar such
oversight.47 In Gutierrez de Martinez, the Court noted that the
Westfall Act itself made no direct mention of the standards for courts
to conduct review of the prosecutor's certification.48 Yet although the
Supreme Court found that Congress did not clearly address the pre-

42 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 21. In each of these cases, the courts examined the
text of the JJDPA and the legislative history to determine if judicial review was precluded.
43. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1988) (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 830 (1985)).
44. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998).

45. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032; see also United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 304
(5th Cir. 1997).
46. See supra note 21 (listing cases).
47. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1319 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing
the Gutie"ez de Martinez case).
48. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagna, 515 U.S. 417, 424 (1995) ("Congress did not
address the precise issue unambiguously, if at all.").
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cise issue, it held that courts have the authority and the ability to re
view substantively the prosecutor's certification under the Act.49
Some courts have distinguished the absence of preclusion language
in the JJDPA from the Westfall Act because the section of the JJDPA
that describes the transfer provision50 contains standards by which a
court can determine if the transfer of a juvenile to criminal court is in
the interest of justice.51 Some courts have argued that the inclusion of
standards in one section of the statute (the transfer provision) and not
in another (the certification provision) demonstrates that Congress
knew how to craft these standards if it desired to do so. 52 Therefore,
Congress can be assumed to have purposefully excluded the standards
from the other section.53
Although this construction may create a presumption that
Congress intended to exclude review of the certification, it is insuffi
cient to overcome the Gutierrez de Martinez Court's rationale for ju
dicial review.54 The review of the prosecutor's certification is critical
to the court's traditional constitutional role of protecting the citizenry
from arbitrary and unconstitutional actions by other coordinate
branches of government.ss Without the oversight role of the courts,
the judicial branch would be relegated to the "rubber-stamp work" of
making decisions in cases based entirely upon actions of the Executive
Branch.s6 The mission of the courts and the process of judicial delib
eration is not consistent with this type of "mechanical judgment. "s7

49. See Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 436-37.
50. The transfer provision permits the courts to transfer a juvenile from juvenile to adult
status. Section 5032 discusses both the certification procedure, which establishes federal ju
risdiction, and the transfer procedure. The transfer provision explicitly provides for judicial
review: "Evidence of the following factors shall be considered, and findings with regard to
each factor shall be made in the record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the inter
est of justice." 18 U.S. C.A. § 5032.
51. The statute lists the following such factors: "the age and social background of the
juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior de
linquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity;
the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availabil
ity of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems." 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032,
52 See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1997).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male J.AJ., 134 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 1998) (ap
plying Supreme Court precedent from Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983), which
states that "[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten
tionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion" (emphasis added)); see also
United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 305.
54. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
55. See Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Crimi·
nal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review ofProsecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 1309, 1340-41 (1997).
56. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagna, 515 U.S. 417, 426 (1995) ("[It would be] per
plexing [to see] Article m judges in the role of petty functionaries, persons required to enter
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The Supreme Court has stated time and again that judicial review
of executive branch actions "will not be cut off unless there is persua
sive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress."58 Fed
eral judges have traditionally proceeded from the "strong presumption
that Congress intends judicial review" of executive branch actions and
decisions.59 Therefore, given the Gutierrez de Martinez Court's focus
upon the failure of Congress to preclude judicial review in the statute
and the importance of the policy considerations supporting review,60
the mere presumption of a statutory construction is insufficient to evi
dence congressional intent to preclude judicial review.61
B.

The Legislative History Highlights the Role of the State in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings

Although Congress did not address the question of judicial review
in the text of the statute, the legislative history of the JJDPA evinces
congressional intent to provide for judicial review of the prosecutor's
certification. First, it emphasizes the importance of the policy of fed
eral abstention. Second, the legislative history establishes standards
by which courts can review the certification to determine if the crime
at issue implicates the substantial federal interest needed to override
the policy of federal deference to the states.

1.

Federal Abstention

The legislative history of the JJDPA includes an exhaustive over
view of the activities and efforts by states to address the problem of
juvenile delinquency.62 As was stated by the 1974 drafters and reiter
ated in the subsequent amendments to the juvenile justice statute, "ju
venile delinquency matters should generally be handled by the
States."63 Congress recognized that the certification requirement was
as a court judgment an executive officer's decision, but stripped of capacity to evaluate inde
pendently whetller tlle executive's decision is correct.").

57. See Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S.at 434.
58. Abbott Labs.v.Gardner, 387 U.S.136, 140 (1967) (citing numerous cases).
59. Bowen v.:Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).
60. For a discussion of tlle policy considerations supporting review in Guiterrez de
Martinez, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of tlle corre
sponding policy arguments supporting judicial review under tlle JJDP A, see infra Section

Il.B.
61. The scope of prosecutorial discretion will be discussed infra Section I.B.3.
62 See S. REP. No. 93-1011 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5283 ("[This]
bill ... provides for Federal leadership and coordination of tlle resources necessary to de
velop and implement at tlle State and local community level effective programs for tlle pre
vention and treatment of juvenile delinquency." (emphasis added)).
63. S.REP. No.98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.3182, 3526.
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intended to limit federal jurisdiction over juveniles.64 While substan
tive limitations on federal jurisdiction, alone, do not "necessarily im
plicate a concomitant judicial power to look behind such decision[s],"65
the legislative history shows that Congress intended the court to re
strict jurisdiction to only those cases that truly merit federal involve
ment. Thus, Congress chose to abstain from juvenile delinquency
matters absent the existence of a substantial federal interest.66
Although the JJDPA establishes a mechanism that increases the
federal role in the prosecution of juvenile crime, the statute is, first
and foremost, a funding mechanism authorizing grants to states, local
governments, and private agencies to coordinate and encourage the
development of programs designed to address the juvenile delin
quency problem.67 Congress recognized that federal intervention in
the juvenile delinquency field was imperative in order to "provide
needed financial assistance and resources" to help with "a State and
local problem which must be dealt with by the State and local gov
ernments."68 Rather than creating a federal infrastructure for the
prosecution and treatment of juvenile offenders, the JJDPA estab
lished federal programs that focused primarily on researching the ef
fectiveness of various delinquency and preventative programs.69 Al
though the JJDPA established a new program to coordinate juvenile
delinquency programs operated by the federal government, the pri
mary purpose of this program was to provide comprehensive national
leadership for addressing the problems of juvenile delinquency.70 Be
cause juvenile delinquency efforts involve areas of society that are co64. United States v.Juvenile Male #1, 86F3d 1314, 1318 (4th Cir.1996).

65. United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86F.3d at 1319.
66. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. 280, 284 (E.D.Va. 1994) (citing
United States v. Sechrist, 640F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1981), which recognizes that the certifica
tion process is a part of the general policy of federal abstention). It is important to remem
ber that prior to the enactment of the JJDP A, Congress had minimal involvement in juvenile
delinquency prosecutions and that the JJ DP A represented an attempt to include the federal
government in this field. The policy of abstention recognizes that Congress will not enter
this particular field unless there is a substantial federal interest.
67. See S.REP. No. 93-1011, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283.
68. S. REP. No.93-1011, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5287.
69. According to the Department of Justice, over forty percent of these federal pro
grams are research-related, as opposed to programs that provide treatment to juvenile of
fenders. See Helen N. Connelly, Juvenile Delinquency Development Statements (visited Oct.
26, 1998) <http://www.ncjrs.org/ txtfiles/ fs-9524.txt>.
70. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1298 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C. A.N. 5333, 5333
("[P]rovide a comprehensive, coordinated approach to ...juvenile delinquency
). An
other primary reason for the Act was to encourage the States to adopt the constitutional
guarantees that the United States Supreme Court had extended to juveniles in delinquency
proceedings. These provisions included, for example: the right to an attorney, right to a
speedy trial, and right to confront witnesses. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966).
• . . ."
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ordinated by state and local governments, such as "law enforcement,
education, [and] recreation,"71 Congress recognized that community
resources and state and local organizations are critical in dealing with
juvenile offenders effectively and humanely.72 In fact, the legislative
history primarily discusses how congressional action will assist the
states in improving their own juvenile justice systems.73 It is therefore
significant to recall that even today, the federal government has no de
tention facilities to offer services to children adjudicated as delin
quents in federal district court.74
Even as Congress expanded the areas of federal jurisdiction into
drug offenses and serious violent felonies,75 Congress did not eliminate
the focus upon the idea that the State should exercise primary control
over juvenile delinquency. Specifically, Congress rejected full adop
tion of recommendations by the Attorney General's Task Force on
Violent Crime that would have eliminated the policy of federal ab
stention and provided federal courts with original jurisdiction over
federal crimes by juveniles.76 Instead, Congress concluded that the
policy of federal abstention is an important and beneficial concept that
should be respected, absent a determination that a substantial federal
interest is involved.77 Thus, Congress recognized that the state juve
nile courts were the appropriate place to handle the problem of delin
quency.
While subsequent amendments to the 1974 statute have expanded
the grounds for assumption of jurisdiction by the federal government
for serious violent felonies,78 the inherent preference for state jurisdic
tion over delinquency proceedings is still present.79 Congress reiter-

71. S. REP. N o. 93-1011, at 65-66 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5286.
72 See supra note 62.
73. See S. REP. No. 93-1011 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5283 (finding
that this Act provides grants to communities and State and local governments who submit
juvenile delinquency program models that adopt federal guidelines and standards for trying
juveniles in court).
74. See Connelly, supra note 69; John Scalia, Juvenile Delinquents in the Federal Crimi
nal Justice System, February 1997, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, at 3 (Feb.
1997) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/jdfcjs.txt>. Because a conviction in juvenile
court is different from a criminal court conviction, children who are found guilty are deemed
to have been adjudicated as delinquent.
75. See Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6467(a) (1988) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C.A. §
5032 (West Supp. 1998)). This provision extends federal jurisdiction to crime that involves
the knowing or intentional manufacture, distribution, or purchase of certain controlled sub
stances. See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a) (West Supp. 1998).
76. See S. REP. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529.
77. See S. REP. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529.
78. The amendments to the JJDPA in 1984 and 1988 expanded the grounds upon which
the federal government could assume jurisdiction over juveniles. See supra note 13.
79. "The essential concepts of the [JJ DPA] are that juvenile delinquency matters should
generally [be] handled by the States and that criminal prosecution of juvenile offenders
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ated this preference for state jurisdiction in its 1984 amendments when
it stated that the prosecution of juvenile offenders should be reserved
for only those cases involving particularly serious conduct.80 In order
to define serious conduct and the substantial federal interest concept,
Congress stated that it intends that:
[A] determination that there is a "substantial Federal interest" [should]
be based on a finding that the nature of the offense or the circumstances
of the case give rise to special Federal concerns. Examples of such cases
could include an assault on, or assassination of, a Federal official, an air
craft hijacking, a kidnapping where State boundaries are crossed, a major
espionage or sabotage offense, participation in large-scale drug traffick
ing, or significant and willful destruction of property belonging to the
United States.81
Thus, federal jurisdiction was intended only for a small subset of cases
that truly implicate federal interests.82 The certification requirement is
an integral component of the federal policy of abstention, ensuring
that only those cases with a substantial federal interest enter the federal
court system.83

2.

Establishment of Standards

The enactment of the JJDPA and its subsequent amendments
comprised a significant expansion of federal involvement in juvenile
delinquency prosecution. In the 1984 amendments to the JJDPA,
Congress found it necessary to outline the standards the court system
should consider in assuming federal jurisdiction over a child and to de
fine the "substantial federal interest" prong of the JJDPA.84 The
Supreme Court has stated that judicial review is permitted only where

should be reserved for only those cases involving particularly serious conduct by older juve
niles. The committee continues to endorse these concepts ...." United States v. Juvenile
Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1321 n.9 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting the legislative history from the 1984
amendment to the JJDPA).
80. See S.REP. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C. C.A.N.3182, 3529, 3531 (reit
erating the statement of the 1974 Congress that juvenile delinquency matters should be pri
marily handled by the states).
81. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 389 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. C.C.A.N.3182, 3529.
82. The examples provided in the legislative history are in line with examples cited by
judicial commentators and scholars who find a need to linrlt federal involvement in juvenile
crime. See infra Section II.B; see also COMMITIEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS, at 22-30 (1995) [hereinafter COMMITIEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING] (recom
mending that Congress should allocate criminal jurisdiction to the federal courts only under
linrlted circumstances, such as when the proscribed activity targets the federal government
itself or involves an international component, a complex enterprise, or widespread state or
local government corruption).
83. See COMMITIEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 82, at 22-30.
84. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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there are meaningful standards to aid a court in its review.85 Accord
ingly, the courts that have conducted review of the "substantial federal
interest" prong of a federal prosecutor's certification have followed
one of two tests: (a) a comparison of the crime committed to the list
of crimes enumerated in the legislative history of the JJDPA, or (b) a
review of the legislative history of the criminal statute violated. These
approaches present workable and manageable standards for review of
the reasons underlying the government's decision to proceed in fed
eral court, and thus satisfy the Court's requirements for permitting ju
dicial review.86
First, a court can determine if a "substantial federal interest" has
been implicated by comparing the list of circumstances giving rise to
special federal concerns in the JJDPA's legislative history to the crime
allegedly committed by the juvenile. While the list of sample crimes
noted above is not exhaustive, it provides a useful basis for determin
ing by analogy whether Congress intended a crime to provide a suffi
cient basis to assume jurisdiction over a juvenile.87 Courts in the
Fourth Circuit have found this list to be an integral part of the statu
tory restrictions that Congress placed upon the assumption of federal
jurisdiction and to provide meaningful standards for reviewing the cer
tification to determine if a "substantial federal interest" exists in a
prosecution.88 As the Fourth Circuit wrote in United States v. NIB,89
"[w]hen an offense is listed among the examples in the legislative his
tory," a court can find that the "substantial federal interest" prong has
been satisfied.90 A court could also resolve the "substantial federal in
terest" question by determining if the alleged crime rises to the level
of the crimes included in the list in the legislative history. For exam
ple, in United States v. Male Juvenile,91 the federal prosecutor filed a
certification under the JJDPA alleging that a "single instance of ordi
nary bank robbery" amounted to a "substantial federal interest."92 In
rejecting this argument, the court held that this crime is "clearly dif
ferent in kind from those offenses suggested by the [legislative his-

85. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 830 (1985)).
86. See supra note 85.
87. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. 280, 283·84 (E.D.Va. 1994). For the
list of crimes in the legislative history, see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
88. See United States v. NIB, 104 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Juvenile
Male #1, 86F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Male Juvenile, 844F. Supp. 280 (E.D.
Va. 1994).
89. 104F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 1997)..
90. NJB, 104F.3d at 635.
91. 844F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Va. 1994).
92. United States v. Male Juvenile, 844F. Supp. at 284-85.
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tory]."93 At this point, the court shifted the burden of proof of compli
ance with the JJDP A back to the prosecutor to assert some substantial
allegation of federal concem.94 The court found the prosecutor's justi
fications to be unpersuasive and accordingly declined jurisdiction.95 If
this type of certification were permitted, the court held, then the doors
of the federal court would be open to virtually any violent federal fel
ony and would "make a mockery of the general policy of [federal] ab
stention. "96
A second way that courts can reach the "substantial federal inter
est" i.J;J.quiry is to review the legislative history of the violated statute to
determine if the threshold of 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 has been met. For
example, United States v. Juvenile Male #191 involved an allegation that
a juvenile had violated the federal carjacking statute.98 The juvenile
respondent attempted to minhnize the level of federal interest in
volved by claiming that the theft of an automobile was not a federal
concem.99 The court then analyzed the legislative history of the car
jacking statute to determine the intent of Congress in passing the pro
hibition.100 The court determined that Congress acted with serious
concern regarding the increase of carjackings, particularly by juve
niles, and therefore imposed harsh penalties for the violation of the
Act.101 Ultimately, due to these factors, the court held that there are

93. 844F. Supp. at 284

.

94. See 844F. Supp. at 284 The Assistant United States Attorney argued, over his own
objection that he was not required to make this defense, that the bank in question was
"FDIC insured; that the robbery was particularly violent in that the defendant threatened to
kill certain bank employees; that roughly twenty-five percent of bank robberies in this dis
trict are tried in Federal court, and those are usually cases like this one which involve vio
lence; and that the defendant has a violent background." 844 F. Supp. at 284-85 (internal
citations omitted).
.

95. See 844F. Supp. at 284.
96. 844F. Supp. at 285.
97. 86F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996).
98. In 1992, Congress federalized the crime of carjacking. See Pub. L. No. 102-519, §
lOl(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. A. § 2119 (West Supp. 1998)).
99. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86F.3d 1314, 1321 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting ad
ditionally that the use of a firearm and nature of the crime of carjacking itself might also be
relevant to the federal nature of the case).
100. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86F.3d at 1321.
101. See 86 F.3d at 1321. That Congress considered this offense to be particularly seri
ous can be seen in the punishment prescribed for violators of the Act - imprisonment for
up to fifteen years in circumstances where no one is injured and the provision for the possi
bility of the death penalty if the carjacking results in the victim's death. See 86F.3d at 1321.
The court also found relevant the legislative history of the carjacking statute, which dis
cussed the "rash of theft by juveniles" and the "substantial threat [they pose] to public
safety. " 86 F.3d at 1321 (quoting 138 CONG. REC. S17,961 (1992) (remarks of Sen. Lauten
berg)).
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"strong indicators [that] more than a run of the mill federal interest"
was involved.102

3.

Prosecutorial Discretion

Some courts have rejected the argument that the JJDPA or the
statute's legislative history supports judicial review of a prosecutor's
certification.103 Instead of favoring judicial review, these critics hold
that based upon traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion, judges
are not competent to address this question at all.104 It has been the
longstanding practice of the American criminal justice system to
commit prosecutorial decisions to the complete discretion of the
prosecutor.105 The decision about whether to prosecute - the charg
ing decision - is typically considered to be one of the most prominent
decisions committed to the prosecutor's discretionary power.106 Some
courts have considered the certification of a "substantial federal inter
est" to be a "perfunctory corollary to the decision to prosecute itself,"
and accordingly have held that this decision should be free from judi
cial oversight.107 This argument reasons that because prosecutors
make the determination of the existence of a "substantial federal in
terest" in every case, they alone are competent to conclude that the
statutory requirements of the certification have been met.108
Proponents of this viewpoint look to standards outlined by the
United States Department of Justice for the determination of whether
a "substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution,"109 and
conclude that judges are "ill-equipped" to review the factors upon

102. 86 F.3d at 1320-21. The application of this reasoning seems to accept the troubling
rationale that a response to political pressure can be an adequate reason for Congress to
federalize a crime. Yet this rationale at least provides a principled means for courts to limit
the expansion of juvenile crime to areas where Congress did not intend federal jurisdiction
to extend.
103. For a list of these cases, see supra note 21.
104. See supra note 21.
105. Prosecutors have the authority to decide whom to prosecute, for what charge, and
oftentimes, due to the sentencing guidelines, what sentence to impose. In these areas of
broad discretion, courts typically do not review the prosecutor's decisions and actions. See
Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717,
736-59 {1996).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 {1992) (granting discretion over
the charging decision); Lara Beth Sheer, Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1353-55
{1998).
107. United States v. Jarrett, 133F.3d 519, 540 (7th Cir. 1998).
108. See Jarrett, 133F.3d at 539-40.
109. United States Dept. of Justice, Attorney's Manual, § 9-27.220 {Sept. 1997) [herein
after Attorney's Manual]. The Manual states that the determination of a "substantial fed
eral interest " is integral to every decision whether to prosecute. See id.
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which prosecutors rely.110 The "substantial federal interest" factors
listed in the Department of Justice manual are:
[f]ederal law enforcement priorities; [t]he nature and seriousness of the
offense; [t]he deterrent effect of prosecution; [t]he person's culpability in
connection with the offense; [t]he person's history with respect to crimi
nal activity; [t]he person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or
prosecution of others; and [t]he probable sentence or other consequences
if the person is convicted.111

It is argued that these factors are "administrative in nature, [deter
mined] after a studied assessment of the Government's policy visions
and priorities," and that just like a prosecutor's charging decision, this
decision is ill suited to judicial review.112 The charging decision is
normally not subject to judicial review because the prosecutor makes
the determination based on the strength of the evidence and the prob
able success of a trial on the charge.113 Arguably, these considerations
may be beyond the expertise of reviewing courts.114
Yet the ability of courts to review the actions of a prosecutor,
based upon the Justice Department's standards, is not outside the
bounds of judicial action.
Significantly, even the Department of
Justice Manual states that United States Attorneys should take great
care in determining whether a "substantial federal interest" exists un
der the JJDPA, because the decision will likely be scrutinized and
challenged.ns Moreover, unlike the considerations that are beyond
the expertise of reviewing courts, judges routinely consider and review
the factors that the Department of Justice believes comprise the de
termination of a "substantial federal interest" in the JJDPA.
Courts, for instance, often review decisions by prosecutors that in
corporate the standards set out by the Department of Justice in two

110. See Elisabeth Alden Bresee, Prosecutorial Discretion, 15 GEO. LJ. 859, 859 n.1045
(1987) (citing cases supporting the general principle).
111. Attorney's Manual, supra note 109, at § 9-27.230 (numbers omitted); see also John
S. Austin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Substantial Assistance: The Power and Authority of
Judicial Review - United States v. Wade, 15 CAMPBELL L. REV. 263, 284 (1993).
112 Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 540.
113. For instance, prosecutors decide to prosecute some defendants but not others
based on the strength of evidence and the probable success at trial. See Steven D. Qymer,
Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 727 (1997).
114. See Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 540.
115. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Trying Juveniles in Federal Court, 9 CRIM. JUST., Fall
1994, at 45. The United States Department of Justice Manual advises U.S. Attorneys to ab
stain from prosecutions if "[n]o substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution."
Attorney's Manual, supra note 109, at § 9-27.220. While the fact that the Justice
Department cautions restraint does not mandate judicial review, it does provide evidence
that even prosecutors themselves are aware of the possibility of the overzealous pursuit of
federal prosecutions, thus providing further support for judicial oversight.
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settings: good faith challenges and transfer proceedings.116 While
prosecutors' decisions are typically considered to be made in good
faith, this consideration is only a presumption. When this good faith
standard is challenged, courts must consider the government's objec
tive in the prosecution.117 In making this determination, courts have
traditionally had a role in examining the rationality of a prosecutor's
charging decision.118 Courts then are in the position of "second
guessing policy decisions [made by the prosecutor] that play a role in
[the] charging [decisions]."119 Defendants in a criminal case making a
good faith, selective prosecution challenge are requesting that the
government inform the court of the basis for the prosecution to ensure
that the prosecutor is not improperly charging one defendant over an
other.120 Similarly, in the juvenile context, the juvenile defendant
wishes to ensure that the JJDPA's guidelines for assuming federal ju
risdiction have been met. Thus, judicial review, in addition to pro
tecting the policy of federal abstention, can temper concerns regarding
potential prosecutorial misconduct.121 If judges are · not capable of
countering prosecutorial pressure toward broad interpretations of
statutes aimed at obtaining more convictions, the statutory require
ment of a "substantial federal interest" would be "reduced to mere
surplusage."122 Specifically, such broad interpretations of the JJDPA
could result in virtually any case involving a violent felony rising to the
level of a "substantial federal interest."123
Furthermore, in the context of juveniles, Congress and the judicial
system have determined that courts are competent to make these
types of policy determinations. According to the Trial Manual for De-

116. For a discussion of good faith challenges, see infra note 117 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of transfer proceedings and cases that address juvenile transfers, see supra
notes 50-53.
117. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); Daum v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
342, 343 (1972) (holding that the equal protection strict scrutiny test includes an inquiry into
whether there are other means by which the government could achieve its objective);
Clymer, supra note 113, at 728.
118. See Oymer, supra note 113, at 727 n.350.
119. Id. at 728.
120. See generally id.; Heller, supra note 55.
121. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. Va. 1994) (noting
that the court had "grave concerns that the case was certified for reasons other than those
articulated by the Government at the hearing").
122. United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. at 284.
123. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1127, 1139-40 & n.66 (1997) (discussing the Department of Justice's belief that its at
torneys will exercise discretion in prosecuting federal crimes and the failure of this policy,
particularly as demonstrated by the repeated attempts by prosecutors to circumvent the
mailing element in mail fraud cases).
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fense Attorneys in Juvenile Cases ,124 when a juvenile is being trans
ferred to criminal court, courts typically review both the juvenile's past
record and the seriousness of the offense - two factors that are also
part of the determination of whether a "substantial federal interest"
exists.125 If courts are capable of reviewing these factors when a juve
nile is transferred, they are also competent to review the certification
for these same factors in the decision to assume federal jurisdiction.
Yet these policy decisions are the very ones that many claim are "par
ticularly ill-suited to judicial review."126
Despite this evidence that courts have the competence to review
the factors that prosecutors use to determine whether a "substantial
federal interest" exists in the prosecution, some commentators have
argued that judicial review should be limited only to constitutional set
tings.127 Although review of the prosecutor's decisionmaking in fed
eral adult criminal law occurs under restricted circumstances, the re
mainder of this Note will argue that the strong deference to federal
abstention and the acceptance of separate procedural protections for
juveniles merit an extension of the ability to review prosecutorial deci
sions in the certification process.
II.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL REVIEW

Congress has repeatedly stated that "[t]he United States has a long
tradition of dealing differently with juveniles than with adults . . . in
the hope that juveniles can be rechannelled into becoming law abiding
citizens."128 Children are not simply young adults; accordingly, the law
has developed different procedures and rules that recognize the
unique circumstances that surround childhood. Because of society's
special treatment of children, the usual deference given to prosecutors
should not extend to the juvenile delinquency context.
In the
Gutierrez de Martinez case, the Court relied heavily on policy con-

124. RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATIORNEYS IN JUVENILE
CASES {1991).
125. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 124, at § 13.11; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West
Supp. 1998); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 {1961) (asserting that the factors for
review of a transfer decision should include the seriousness of the offense, the prosecutorial
merit or the likelihood of indictment, and whether the client is amenable to treatment).
126. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 {1985); see also United States v. Juvenile
Male J.AJ., 134 F.3d 905, 909 {8th Cir. 1998) {holding that the charging decisions involve
criteria that are "precisely the sort of policy judgments invested in the executive, not the ju
dicial, branch of government" (citations omitted)).
127. See Oymer, supra note 113 (noting that the charging decision is limited by the con
stitutional protections of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses).
128. S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 6 {1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5290 (quot
ing NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
CORRECTIONS 247 {1973)).
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cems in its decision to permit judicial review.129 With regard to the
JJDPA, there are equally important policy concerns that militate
against a finding that judicial review should be prohibited.130 Such
policy considerations are an appropriate basis for permitting judicial
review.
This Part argues that these policy considerations - which include
the importance that society places on the proper treatment of children
and the need for an appropriate forum to meet children's needs mandate that courts should have the opportunity to review a prosecu
tor's certification in these cases. Section II.A argues that the law's
separate and different treatment of children and adults provides a jus
tification for judicial review of certifications under the JJDPA. Sec
tion II.B then argues that the goals of the juvenile court system and
the current societal conception of the child cannot be respected by
transforming the federal district court into a juvenile court. This Part
concludes that the federal government should abstain from assuming
jurisdiction in juvenile delinquency proceedings unless a sufficiently
important federal interest is implicated.
A.

The Status of the Child

The different treatment of children has an extensive historical
foundation. At least as far back as the seventh century, society ac
cepted that criminal law should treat juveniles differently than
adults.131 Philosophers such as John Stuart Mill recognized an age
before which individuals are not capable of making rational decisions
about their own actions.132 These philosophers introduced the notion
that until children possess the maturity and rationality of adults, the
law should treat them differently to enable them to become produc
tive members of adult society.133 American society has adopted these

129. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text
130. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (4th Cir. 1996)
("[O]ther perhaps weightier considerations . . . militate against finding that . . . judicial re
view has been overcome in the juvenile justice arena." (internal quotations and citations
omitted)).
131. King Ine's proscription against stealing sets the age of majority at ten: "If any one
steal, so that his wife and his children know it not, let him pay LX . . .A boy of X years may
be privy to a theft . . . ."
CHARLEs H. SmREMAN & FREDERIC G. REAMER,
REHABILITATING JUVENILE JUSTICE 3 (1986) (quoting WILEY B. SANDERS, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS FOR A THOUSAND YEARS: SELECTED READINGS FROM ANGLO SAXON TlMES
TO 1900 (1970)). While King Ine declared a ten-year- old to be capable of criminal activity,
it is important to remember that the JJDPA defines a juvenile as a person under eighteen
years of age. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998).
132 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub
lishing Co., Inc. 1978); see also SmREMAN & REAMER, supra note 131, at 4 (discussing phi
losophies of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill).
133. See SmREMAN & REAMER, supra note 131, at 4.
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principles by applying different legal rules and principles in the rela
tionships between children and both the state and their families.134
Within each of these settings, the law presumes that a child is incapa
ble of voicing a rational preference and therefore substitutes another's
articulation of the child's interests.135
Within the law of the family, parents have constitutional rights to
direct the upbringing and care of their children.136 The Supreme Court
has held that the state can infringe upon this constitutional right only
in the most extreme settings.137 Under this deferential standard, par
ents have the right, for example, to punish their children physically,138
direct the medical treatment their children may receive,139 and to vol
untarily commit their children to a mental institution.140

134. These settings involve a combination of both state and federal law. The majority of
laws that address a child's relationship to his family are governed by state law, such as di
vorce, child custody, and abuse and neglect proceedings. Federal law also makes significant
contributions to the understanding that the law should apply differently to children. See in
fra notes 136-148 and accompanying text.
135. There has been much scholarly research and debate about the ability and appropri·
ateness of substituting a child's voice with that of either a parent or the state. Instead of as
suming that a child's voice can be adequately voiced through other means, many scholars
have recommended a new standard where children's voices are recognized for their unique
ness. See, e.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Per
spectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 12 (1994). The law can be said to "presume"
that a child is incapable of vqicing a rational preference, because some children will not be
immature but will still be accorded this status. For instance, a child could have significant
experience and expertise in dealing with money and contracts and still be able to void a con
tract on the basis of his age, while an adult without such experience would not be accorded
the same protection.
136. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971) (permitting parents to direct the edu
cational upbringing of their children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
("[W]e think it entirely plain that the [statute in question] interferes with the liberty of par
ents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.").
137. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that clear and convinc
ing evidence is required to terminate one's parental rights).
138. See Fitzgerald, supra note 135, at 37-38.
139. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991) (permitting parents to
reject a chemotherapy treatment for their child); In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y.
1979) (permitting parents to choose nutritional therapy for their child's Hodgkin's disease,
despite the recommendations of the child's physicians). But see People v. Rippberger, 231
Cal. App. 3d 1667 (Ct. App. 1991).
140. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding a statute that permitted the in·
stitutionalization of a child without an adversary hearing); see also Lois Weithom, Mental
Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40
STAN. L. REV. 773, 788-91 (1988) (discussing how most juveniles admitted to psychiatric fa.
cilities have problems associated with normal development, not severe or acute mental ill
ness). These standards are in stark contrast to laws that prohibit assault against adults and
commitment laws that require a person to be a threat to themselves or others before they
can be involuntarily instiqitionalized. Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-335 et seq. (1998)
with § 16.1-345(1) (comparing Virginia statutes for commitment of adults and minors).
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It is not only in these intra-family settings that family law has
treated children differently than adults.141 Children are not permitted
to appear as parties in divorce proceedings that involve decisions on
their custodial arrangements, nor may they be privy to child support
hearings.142 Instead, the "best interest" standard has developed to
substitute the state's voice as a proxy for the child's.143 Because chil
dren are not treated simply as little adults, the law has developed the
"best interest" standard to address the unique needs of children.144
This different treatment extends beyond family law into relations
between children and the state. Historically in this country, many
children were subject to the same criminal proceedings and sentences
as adult criminals were.145 Progressive reformers of the nineteenth
century saw this undifferentiated treatment as a great injustice to chil
dren, who were viewed by many as incapable of possessing criminal
intent and in need of specialized treatment.146 Accordingly, these re
formers formalized their ideas for a new approach to dealing with
young offenders in the establishment of the juvenile court system.147
The juvenile court, thus, "was part of a general movement directed

141. See Fitzgerald, supra note 135, at 14 (noting that the law "consigns children to the
private realm of their parents' care and control"). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that
in certain contexts, such as those involving free speech rights and the ability to petition a
court for an abortion, children are given standing in legal disputes that are "of keen interest
to us as adults." Id. at 15.
142. See Fitzgerald, supra note 135, at 42, 46-47.
143. The "best interest" standard is utilized in a variety of family law settings, including
abuse and neglect proceedings, custody disputes, guardianship, and judicial waiver hearings.
Statues that mandate that decisions be made in the best interests of the child often specify
the standards by which a judge should make his or her determination. For example, in
Michigan, the "best interests of the child" standard means the "sum total of the following
factors [are] to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court: (a) The love, affec
tion, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child. (b) The
capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance
and continuation of the educating and raising of the child in its religion or creed, if any. (c)
The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing,
medical care or other remedial care recogni2ed and permitted under the laws of this state in
place of medical care, and other material needs . • . . (k) Any other factor considered by the
court to be relevant to a particular dispute . . . •" MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 700.424c(5)
(West 1995 & Supp. 1999).
144. It is possible to argue that permitting the prosecutor to file an unreviewable certifi
cation is simply another application of the best interest standard - substitution of the voice
of the prosecutor for that of the child. This argument is unpersuasive. Unlike the traditional
best interest standard in which the role of the party whose voice is substituted for that of the
child is to assist or protect, the role of the prosecutor is to punish and penalize the child.
145. See Joseph F. Yeckel, Note, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Rethinking Federal Inter
vention in Juvenile Justice, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 331, 334 (1997).
146. See SHIREMAN & BEAMER, supra note 131, at 4.
147. To that end, in 1899, Illinois became the first state to establish a juvenile court. By
1945, every state had established a juvenile court system. See ANTIIONY M. PLA'IT, THE
CHILD SAVERS 9 (2d ed. 1977); ROBERT M. MENNELL, THORNS & TlilSTLES: JUVENILE
DELINQUENTS IN TIIE UNITED STATES 1825-1940, at 132 (1973).
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toward removing adolescents from the criminal law process and cre
ating special programs for delinquent, dependent, and neglected chil
dren. "148
Today, juvenile courts continue to operate in a procedurally and
substantively different manner than criminal courts. For example, the
juvenile court system considers rehabilitation to be its primary goal.149
The courts recognize that children are fundamentally different from
adults in their cognitive abilities and their amenability to treatment.150
While states have instituted more punitive measures for juvenile de
linquents, which include an increased focus on incarceration as op
posed to probation, the severity and purpose of sentencing in juvenile
as opposed to criminal court is still dramatically different.151 Signifi
cantly, sentences for juveniles normally terminate when a child is no
longer considered a juvenile, typically at age eighteen or twenty-one.
Unlike an adult sentence, which does not relate to the age of the of
fender, a juvenile sentence "recognizes the unique physical, psycho
logical, and social features of young persons in the definition and ap
plication of delinquency standards."152 The changes in the juvenile
court system throughout the states have not altered this central func
tion of the court.153 These changes recognize that while juveniles are

148. Id. at lO.
149. Significantly, researchers have concluded t!Iat rehabilitative treatment - for ex
ample, community-based interventions - works. The question t!Iat remains is how to de
velop t!Ie most effective means of providing t!Iese services to children. See Thomas F.
Geraghty, Justice for Children: How Do We Get There?, BB J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY
190, 210 n.43 (1997) (citing a comprehensive directory of treatment services). It is significant
t!Iat Congress, in permitting t!Ie prosecution of serious, violent juvenile crime, explicitly rec
ognized t!Iat t!Ie purpose of lB U.S.C. § 5032 was to "preserve t!Ie principles t!Iat criminal
prosecutions should be reserved for only t!Ie most dangerous juvenile offenders." S. REP.
No. 9B-225, at 391 (19B4), reprinted in 19B4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 31B2, 3531. This language shows
t!Iat Congress intended to maintain t!Ie juvenile court's rehabilitative focus, unless t!Ie crime
is so severe t!Iat t!Ie presumption for rehabilitation is no longer appropriate.
.

150. The amenability to treatment was a central component of progressive reformers'
vision t!Iat delinquency was a condition t!Iat could be cured. See Geraghty, supra note 149,
at 211-12.
151. See CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
31 (199B); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabet!I Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A
Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y
& L. 3B9, 396 n.4 (1999). Furt!Iermore, t!Ie Supreme Court has recognized t!Iat t!Ie juvenile
delinquency proceeding is not a criminal proceeding. See In re Gault, 3B7 U.S. 1, 17 (1967)
(describing delinquency hearing as "civil" in nature).
152. Elizabet!I S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Develop
mental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, SB J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 146 n.39
(1997) (quoting INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS, Standards Relating to Dispositions, 1.1, commentary at 3, (19B2) [hereinafter
ABA STANDARDS]). Juvenile sentencing should also reflect t!Ie "slow process of intellec
tual and emotional maturation during adolescence." Id. (citing ABA STANDARDS, supra, at
1.1, commentary at 19).
.

153. The increase in t!Ie use of punitive measures against juvenile offenders has oc
curred as many have questioned t!Ie continued need for a separate juvenile court. States
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responsible and blameworthy for their actions, it is unrealistic to treat
them as if they are fully mature individuals capable of rational adult
decisionmaking.154 Accordingly, states have lowered the age at which
a child is presumed capable of making rational decisions and therefore
subject to criminal prosecutions.155 These individuals are then re
moved from the juvenile court and transferred to adult criminal pro
ceedings.156 While the juvenile justice legislation has stated that
younger children can face criminal prosecution, the juvenile court re
mains the forum where children's interests and uniqueness are still
recognized.157
Although the Supreme Court has recognized and extended certain
due process protections to children,158 the law continues to recognize
the inherent differences between children and adults. For example,
the federal Constitution does not extend the right to a jury trial to
children.159 The Supreme Court has justified this different treatment
on the ground that juries will increase the adversarial nature of the
proceeding - an aspect that juvenile forums attempt to minimize.160

have responded to the criticism of the alleged failure of the juvenile courts by easing the
standards for the transfer of children from juvenile to criminal court. Commentators sup
porting this view claim that the juvenile court was not established nor equipped to deal with
violent juvenile crime. The societal view is that juveniles who commit violent crime are not
capable of rehabilitation. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness,
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CruMINOLOGY 68 (1997).
As the concern about the rising rate of juvenile crime and the possible inability of rehabilita
tive intervention to succeed has increased, some states have responded by adopting blended
sentencing schemes that permit juvenile court judges to impose both juvenile and adult sen
tences at the same time. After a child has been given rehabilitative intervention, the court
can determine how the child has responded and whether the adult sentence needs to be im
posed. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 191 n.3 (citing PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE
REsPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 55-56 (1996)).
154. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 152, at 146.
155. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-5 (1999) (providing for transfer at age thirteen).
156. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998) (discussing transfer provision).
157. See Geraghty, supra note 149; Scott & Grisso, supra note 152; Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Youth Crime and What Not to Do About It, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 435 (1997). Fur
thermore, while the JJDPA provides for transfer of juveniles to adult court, the fact that a
judge must make a determination that a criminal court is the appropriate forum is another
example of the law's different treatment of juveniles. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032. The law obvi
ously does not provide a similar hearing for adults to determine whether they should be tried
in a criminal court.
158. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (providing for "beyond a reason
able doubt" standard in delinquency prosecutions); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (pro
viding right to counsel, notice of charges, cross-examination and confrontation, and privilege
against self-incrimination); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (holding that
children are not entitled to bail or indictment by grand jury).
159. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
160. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 223-24 (discussing that jury trials do not take into
account the special needs of children and that children have little comprehension of the pro
cess).
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Although the presumption of prosecutorial discretion is fairly well
entrenched in the adult criminal system, the legal system's different
treatment of children provides compelling reasons to deviate from that
standard.161 Importantly, in the federal system, all felony defendants
are afforded the constitutional protection of a grand jury indictment.162
Accordingly, the independent review over the charging decision is ac
complished in an adult proceeding by the grand jury indictment.163
Federal prosecutors, however, proceed against children by informa
tion.164 While it may be somewhat duplicative to provide for judicial
review of a charging decision against an adult defendant, the lack of a
comparable check upon the federal prosecutor in a juvenile proceed
ing is glaring.165
This lack of protection is even more significant given the ability of
prosecutors to transfer a juvenile to adult status.166 Children who are
transferred to adult status would thus be treated more harshly than
adult defendants who are given the protections of the grand jury in
dictment requirement. This lack of protection is significant because
federal prosecutors attempt to try most children brought to federal
court as adults.167 Therefore, the lack of important protections for ju
veniles in the federal system should permit judicial review of the
prosecutor's certification in order to protect children from potential
abuse by the justice system.
This special relationship between children and the state supports
the continued existence of the juvenile court system and the different
treatment of children from adult offenders.168 Because the purpose
and structure of the juvenile justice system differs from the adult sys-

161. See supra Section II.A.
162 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Robert Johnston et al., Procedural Issues, 36
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 983, 985-86 & n.8 (1999).
163. See Johnston et al., supra note 162, at 985-86.
164. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998).
165. While there is much current debate about the value of the grand jury system to pro
tect the interests of defendants, the federal government, as opposed to many state govern
ments, has not shed its requirement of prosecution by indictment for felony defendants. Ac
cordingly, children are being denied the protection of independent review by a grand jury.
166. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (permitting the transfer of a child as young as age thirteen).
While the decision to transfer a child to adult status is subject to review, the initial decision
to bring a child into federal court lnight not be. The factors that establish a substantial fed
eral interest are different from the criteria for determining whether a child is mature enough
to be prosecuted as an adult. Therefore, review of the transfer decision is not sufficient pro
tection.
167. It appears that most children brought to federal court are tried as adults. Only 200
or so juveniles are tried in federal court each year. Most of these children are Native
Americans. Because many federal prosecutions are politically motivated attempts to obtain
higher sentences, the majority of federal prosecutors attempt to try children as adults. See
Scalia, supra note 74, at 3; see also ABA Report, supra note 4, at 15.
168. See supra note 153 (challenging this prelnise).
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tern, different.protections and procedures are required.169 The differ
ent status of children in their relationship to the state serves as an im
portant policy justification for judicial review. Just as policy played an
important role in the Gutierrez de Martinez Court's decision to permit
judicial review, this policy rationale justifies different procedural rules
for children and a potentially broader role for judicial review in the
juvenile context.170

B.

The Benefits of the Juvenile Court Cannot Be Recreated in an
Infrequently Used Federal Distri ct Court

An additional policy reason justifying judicial review of the prose
cutor's certification under the JJDPA is that federal courts are une
quipped to capably handle juvenile delinquency cases.171 Tradition
ally, law enforcement and specifically the adjudication of delinquency
have been state functions.172 Over the past thirty years, however, the
federal government has created an increasing number of new federal
crimes, many of which overlap with state prosecution of similar activ
ity.173 Until the latter part of this century, federal crimes were limited
primarily to crimes that had a distinct federal interest.174 The majority
of other criminal offenses were prosecuted by local officials in the
state courts. This separation of functions was important because crime
was understood as primarily a local concern, where communities
would determine the criminal law in connection with local customs
and interests. Many commentators have challenged the value of cre
ating federal jurisdiction in an area of traditional state control.175 This
Section argues that the rampant nature of the federalization of crime
does a significant disservice to children, particularly in the adjudica-

169. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
170. See Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting
Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254, 1257 (1996).
171. It is important to remember that in the context of the JJDP A, the United States
District Court is transformed into a juvenile courtroom, whose function is to operate proce
durally and substantively as a juvenile court.
172. See MARION, supra note 5, at8.
17 3. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
174. Federal offenses were typically limited to "treason, bribery of federal officials,
perjury in federal court, theft of government property, and revenue fraud. " Sara Sun Beale,
Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 54 3 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL & Soc. SCI. 39, 40 (1996). Furthermore, many commentators initially questioned the
very ability of the federal government to assume jurisdiction over common law crimes. See 2
George L. Haskins & Herbert A. Johnson, HlsTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 6 3 3-4 3 (1971); Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts,
38 HARV. L. REV. 545, 546-48 (1925).
175. See, e.g., Chief Justice Raises Concerns on Federalism, THE THIRD BRANCH
( Administrative Office of the United States Courts), Jun. 1998, at 1-2; A B A Report, supra
note 4, at 26; Clymer, supra note 11 3, at 645-46.
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tion of juvenile delinquency. Moreover, important policy considera
tions, which establish that state courts are the best forum to address
the unique needs of juvenile respondents, provide the same support
for judicial review that other policy rationales did for the Court in

Gutierrez de Martinez.176

As previously noted, Congress has expanded the types of crimes
that can be prosecuted in federal court. It is questionable, however,
whether these new laws will address the problem they were designed
to solve. First, due to the limited amount of resources and reach of
federal law enforcement, federal criminal law will have a limited im
pact upon the conduct that Congress seeks to regulate. As a report
issued by the American Bar Association noted, it is unlikely that the
federalization trend will have any appreciable effect on crime without
a significant infusion of money.177 Accordingly, the rising trend of ju
venile crime, which Congress cited as a primary factor behind the en
actment of the JJDPA, is unlikely to be addressed by trying juveniles
in federal court.178 Second, the enactment of a federal criminal statute
may give the false impression of greater crime control and that ade
quate resources have been applied to the problem. This impression
could disrupt the funding of state criminal processes that are not tied
to federal enforcement.179 Because state juvenile courts and treatment
programs already receive less funding than their adult counterparts,
the false impression of greater crime control could lead to fewer re
sources being directed to the state juvenile delinquency system.180

176. For a discussion of the Gutierrez de Martinez decision and the policy considerations
supporting it, see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
177. See ABA Report, supra note 4, at 18-19 (noting that no effect will be likely without
a "massive (and unlikely) infusion of federal money" and that police executives have stated
that it is "unrealistic to expect that federal authorities will have the resources and inclination
to investigate and prosecute traditionally state and local offenses"). This report also notes
that federal prosecution of domestic drug trafficking, the largest segment of federal prosecu
tions, amounts for only two percent of all prosecutions in the nation. See ABA Report, su
pra note 4, at 20.
178. It is possible to argue that many of the federal crimes that have been enacted are in
direct response to political pressure to address rising crime rates. Thus, federal interests
have been determined on the basis of a crime's seriousness and the level of public concern,
rather than its connection to a substantial federal interest in the prosecution. See ABA Re
port, supra note 4, at 15. While passing legislation may address immediate public pressure
for a direct response to a particular incident, the enactment of a federal criminal code will
not solve the crime problem and may exacerbate the effect. For a discussion of the legisla
tive history of the JJDPA, see supra Section I.B.
179. See ABA Report, supra note 4, at 21 (noting that two highly publicized federal
statutes enacted in 1994 - involving drive-by shootings and interstate domestic violence,
were not cited in a single prosecution in 1997). Furthermore, the prosecution of crimes at
the federal level may have the concurrent effect of decreasing the stature of the state crimi
nal justice system that remains the primary body addressing criminal law in American soci
ety.
180. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 218 & n.67.
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Finally, the federalization of crime that is duplicative of state and
local prosecutions places significant burdens on an already over
whelmed federal system.181 The increase in federal criminal proceed
ings reduces the time that federal judges can allocate to the traditional
functions of the federal judiciary.182 The Judicial Conference of the
United States has noted that the federalization trend will "negatively
impact on the ability of the federal courts to hear federal criminal
prosecutions, as well as carry out vital civil responsibilities in a timely
manner."183
In addition to these concerns with the federalization of crime gen
erally, two important differences between the federal and state system
make federal adjudication of juvenile delinquency both unwise and
harmful to the goals of the juvenile justice system: (1) federal judges
and other court officials lack the experience to work with juvenile of
fenders, and (2) the federal government does not have the programs
or facilities to address the needs of juvenile offenders.
First, as opposed to federal judges, prosecutors, and defense coun
sel, who may not even have one federal juvenile case each year,184 state
court officials have well-developed experience in the most effective
ways to deal with children themselves and the unique rules and cus
toms of a juvenile proceeding.185 The state juvenile court is organized

181. See generally AB A Report, supra note 4.
182. See id. Furthermore, it is important to note that the burden of additional federal
crimes also impacts the enforcement and treatment of offenders. Probation officers and so
cial workers are of great importance in the juvenile system. In fact, most juvenile probation
officers have lighter caseloads so they can put more time and effort into these cases. See
Geraghty, supra note 149, at 228.
183. A B A Report, supra note 4, at 36 & n.62, (quoting September 1992 Report of the
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 57); see also Chief Justice
Rehnquist Raises Concerns on Federalism, supra note 175, at 1-2.
Additionally, it is significant that federal criminal cases generally are given scheduling
priority over civil cases (whether between an individual and the government, or between
individuals). Finally, it should also be noted that some commentators have opined that the
reduction in time for traditional federal judicial functions may have the effect of eroding the
quality and distinctiveness of the federal judiciary, as either more judges are added or judges
cannot adequately and capably handle the judicial tasks before them. See A B A Report, su
pra note 4, at 35-39.
184. While only 150 to 200 children are tried as juveniles each year in federal court, the
certification issue is critical for two reasons. First, as is described in this Section, even for
these 200 children, state courts continue to be the best forum to address their interest. Sec
ond, the certification requirement is the first step to the prosecution of children as adults in
federal court. Each year, approximately 60 to 70 children are transferred to criminal court
once the certification of a substantial federal interest has been accepted. See Scalia, supra
note 74, at 1.
185. Juvenile delinquency proceedings have different procedural rules than criminal
trials. See 18 U. S. C. A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998). For example, there are complicated rules
regarding the confidentiality of the proceedings. Questions such as these, which would be
commonplace in a state court, could occupy a significant portion of a federal trial. The ex
tension of the trial for these reasons does not serve the interests of the court, the public, or
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around the concept that children are fundamentally different from
adults and therefore focuses on the unique problems associated with
the adjudication of children.186 Juvenile courts are flexible systems
that permit judges to take creative steps to lessen the trauma that sim
ply appearing in court may cause a child.187 The juvenile court is a
place where the aggressiveness of the adult criminal court should be
kept to a minimum.188 Thus, it is more likely that the participants in a
state juvenile proceeding will be committed to outcomes that focus on
the best interests of the child involved.189 Juvenile court judges, due to
their experience with children, have the ability and knowledge to
modify trials to take into account the needs of children and to control
attorneys from deviating from the court's specialized purpose.190 In
the few cases they will ever hear, however, federal officials will not re
ceive the training or experience they need to sensitize themselves to
the unique needs of children in delinquency proceedings. Further
more, scant federal prosecutorial and judicial resources are wasted
when these actors must gain expertise in this different trial proce
dure.191
The lack of experience of court officials can also have a significant
impact upon the success of the disposition or rehabilitation. As op
posed to criminal courts, where sentences are based upon statutory
guidelines, dispositions in juvenile court are based upon the particular
needs of the individual child.192 States typically do not have formulas
for sentencing juveniles and instead grant discretion to the trial judge
to adopt an appropriate disposition.193 While the JJDPA also grants

the child. The inefficient use of resources is only compounded when the availability of the
state juvenile court is considered.

186. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 206; Scott & Grisso, supra note 152, at 139 ("Mod
em developmental psychology provides substantial, if indirect, evidence that adolescent
choices about involvement in crime and their decisions as defendants in the legal process
reflect cognitive and psychosocial immaturity.").
187. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 224. The flexibility of the juvenile court system
has long historical roots. See SIDREMAN & REAMER, supra note 131, at 6 (quoting from the
first juvenile court judge in Illinois as to how he, as a juvenile court judge, acts differently
toward children).
188.

See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 224.

See id. at 223-26 (arguing that because the participants in the juvenile court under
stand the cognitive differences between children and adults, they will incorporate this phi
losophy into their trial practice).

189.

190. A judge could keep a prosecutor from overzealously cross-examining a child wit
ness or from moving the proceeding away from its rehabilitative focus. Furthermore, in
states that permit jury trials, the judge could adopt "flexible" systems that could minimize
the impact of a jury upon a child's courtroom experience. See id. at 224-25.
191.

See supra notes

192.

See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 124, at § 38.01.

177-183 and accompanying text.

193. Unlike criminal court, where sentencing is based upon the crime for which one is
convicted, juvenile court sentences are based upon the needs of the child. If a child does not
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this discretion to the trial judge,194 it is unlikely that a federal judge will
have the interdisciplinary connections that are necessary to address
the special needs of the child.195 Furthermore, the United States Sen
tencing Guidelines, which were not drafted with children in mind, re
strict the discretion of the court.196 Thus, without the experience of
daily work with children and the interdisciplinary connections that are
developed through this work, the federal court is unable to achieve a
child-centered focus as successfully as have state juvenile courts.
Second, the lack of involvement of the federal government in the
treatment of juveniles impedes its ability to assist in achieving the
goals of the juvenile delinquency system. The states have traditionally
been the administrative body that has dealt with juvenile crime.197 Be
cause the goal of these proceedings is to help the juvenile re-enter so
ciety,198 juvenile courts need to be connected with services and pro
grams that can achieve this purpose. The federal system is not
equipped to address the needs of juvenile offenders.199 The federal
government does not offer the treatment programs and services that
juveniles require.200 Instead, these programs, which include both resi
dential and nonresidential programs, are located and operated in the
communities where juveniles live. State juvenile court officials know
the programs that are successful in these communities because they
refer juveniles there every day. In fact, the federal government does
not even operate a residential treatment facility for juvenile offenders
or employ juvenile probation or parole officers or attorneys (either
prosecutors or defense attorneys) with specific experience in repre
senting juvenile clients.201
require treatment, a sentence may not be imposed. Even for serious crimes, a juvenile court
can typically dismiss the delinquency finding, concluding that the respondent does not re
quire treatment. See id. at § 38.03(a).
194. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5037 (West Supp. 1998).
195. These interdisciplinary connections can include, for example, relationships with
social workers, community-based delinquency programs, and child psychologists. See Scott
& Grisso, supra note 152, at 181-89. Because the juvenile justice system is child-focused, a
close analysis of the causes of delinquency and the potential for constructive intervention is
required. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 210-11.
196. Significantly, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines "take no account of adolesr..ent
development." ABA Report, supra note 4, at 11 n.17. These are features which are central
to the rehabilitative sentencing function of a juvenile court and which, according to
Congress, are still important and primary goals of delinquency prosecutions in the federal
system.
197. Since crime was not originally thought of as a federal issue, states had the administrative responsibility to deal with the criminal problems within their borders.
198. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 198-201.
199. See ABA Report, supra note 4, at 11 n.17.
200. See id.
201. See id. While it is true that state officials may not be specifically trained, the value
of experience in working with children cannot be overstated.

1036

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1007

As in Gutierrez de Martinez, important policy reasons exist to
permit judicial review that will ensure the accuracy of the prosecutor's
certifi�ation. In juvenile cases, society's concern with the upbringing
of children provides such a basis for judicial review. Although it is
widely understood that there is no easy answer to juvenile delinquency
and the problems of juvenile crime, states have the procedural and
substantive experience to address the complexities of the problem. As
noted by the American Bar Association, the increasing federalization
of juvenile crime has "no obvious benefit"202 and may, in fact, have the
effect of frustrating one of the original reasons for the passage of the
JJDPA - to encourage and enable the states to experiment with dif
ferent types of programs that work with juveniles.203 The federal gov
ernment, and specifically the federal district court, has less of a chance
to accomplish the specific goals of the juvenile delinquency system.
By providing for review over the jurisdictional provision of the
JJDPA, Congress recognized that the adverse consequences that come
with federal prosecution of children militate against increasing federal
prosecutions. Accordingly, there are persuasive reasons for courts to
review the prosecutor's certification to ensure that only truly signifi
cant federal interests will outweigh these important policy rationales.

CONCLUSION
While the grounds for federal jurisdiction are present and continu
ously expanding, Congress has reiterated its position that in these mat
ters, the federal government should defer to the states. A court has a
responsibility to ensure that its jurisdiction has been properly invoked.
Under the procedure established in Gutierrez de Martinez, a court can
review a prosecutor's certification to ensure substantive compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements. Congress, through the legislative
history of the JJDPA, has provided the courts with manageable and
workable standards, and it is the role of the judicial system to ensure
that this deference is upheld.
As long as the judicial system continues to apply different proce
dural rules to children, the state, given its unique interest in the rear
ing and proper treatment of children, should ensure that the most ap
propriate forum for addressing children's needs is found.
The
overwhelming evidence is that in the arena of law enforcement gener
ally and juvenile crime specifically, the state system is the appropriate
venue. Because the treatment of a child will differ significantly based
upon the certification decision, courts must ensure that there is in fact

202 Id. at 11 n.17.
203. See supra Section I.B; supra note 3 and accompanying text.

February 2000]

JJDPA and Judicial Review

1037

a "substantial federal interest," thus justifying the creation of a poor
substitute for the juvenile court at the federal level.

